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MAKING THE WITHDRAWAL: THE EFFECT AT&T MOBILITY V. 
CONCEPCION  WILL HAVE ON STATE LAWS SIMILAR TO 
CALIFORNIA’S DISCOVER BANK  RULE 
 
Zachary R. Brecheisen* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion has had a profound effect 
on the law of arbitration in the United States.  Before AT&T Mobility, many state and federal 
courts had routinely held as unenforceable adhesive arbitration agreements containing class 
action waivers. In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court has upended the conventional thinking on 
contract unconscionability rules and placed a target over a multitude of state laws that resemble 
California’s Discover Bank rule challenging the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) jurisdiction 
over class-wide arbitration waivers.   
State and federal courts are still sorting out AT&T Mobility’s preemptive effect on state 
laws governing the unconscionability of class-wide waivers in arbitration clauses.  Since many 
states have adopted different degrees and adaptations of the Discover Bank rule at issue in AT&T 
Mobility, the holding will likely force courts to address each state’s rule on an individual state-by-
state basis.  Several federal courts have already applied AT&T Mobility, holding that the FAA 
preempts all state laws similar to Discover Bank. These cases have shown federal courts’ 
willingness to broadly construe AT&T Mobility to preempt state laws which rely primarily on 
public policy rationale to find class arbitration waivers unconscionable. 
This Comment will survey state unconscionability laws barring class-wide arbitration 
waivers and analyze (A) which laws the FAA has already preempted, (B) which laws are likely to 
be preempted upon challenge, and (C) the possibility that some state laws may remain outside the 
scope of the FAA. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In 2005, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank addressed the unconscionability 
of class-wide arbitration waivers in contracts of adhesion.1  The case involved a consumer who 
challenged the validity of the arbitration clause in his standard credit card agreement.2  
Specifically, plaintiff argued that the class action waiver rendered the arbitral clause 
unconscionable and thus unenforceable under California law.3  
The California Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff, articulating the three-part “Discover 
Bank rule.”  Accordingly, class action waivers are unconscionable when: (1) the waiver is found 
in a consumer contract of adhesion drafted by a party with superior bargaining power; (2) the 
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1 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005). 
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3 Id. at 1104. 
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disputes between the parties predictably involve small amounts of damages; and (3) the party 
with superior bargaining power is alleged to have carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small claims of money.4  The court found that the 
class-action waiver at issue satisfied all three elements and thus held the contract was 
unenforceable.  In its holding, the court emphasized the crucial importance of having class 
procedures available to consumer to effectively prosecute small-dollar claims.5  The court 
reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow Discover Bank to escape “responsibility for [its] own 
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.”6 
Last year, in AT&T Mobility, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether California’s 
Discover Bank rule directly conflicted with the FAA or whether it was permissible under the 
“savings provision” of FAA § 2.7  Specifically, FAA § 2 allows states to invalidate arbitration 
agreements on “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”8  The 
savings provision therefore allows a court to strike down arbitration agreements under “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”9  In the context of 
class-wide arbitration provisions, however, the Supreme Court noted that the savings provision 
cannot be so broadly applied such that the exception would eventually overwhelm the FAA’s 
general rule favoring enforceable arbitration.10 
The Court viewed the Discover Bank rule as essentially a general requirement that class-
wide arbitration always be available to consumers bound by arbitration contracts.11  The majority 
was particularly concerned with how the three prongs of the Discover Bank rule were almost 
universally applicable to all consumer contracts, effectively rendering its applicability almost 
limitless.12  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion dismissed the so-called “limits” of the Discover 
Bank rule and implied the rule was not actually an “application of [the] unconscionability 
doctrine … [but instead a] state policy placing bilateral arbitration categorically off-limits for 
certain categories of consumer fraud cases, upon the mere ex post demand by any consumer.”13 
After a lengthy critique of class-wide arbitration, the Court held that California’s broad 
Discover Bank rule was outside the scope of the savings provision in FAA § 2 and the rule was 
therefore preempted by the FAA.14  The Court emphasized that the savings provision does not 
“preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives” in enforcing agreements to arbitrate as written.15  Although the Discover Bank 
unconscionability rule applied to all contract terms, its application had a disproportionate impact 
                                                     
4 Id. at 1110. 
5 Id. at 1108–09 (quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 38 (Cal. 2000)). 
6 Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2011)). 
7 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
8 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
9 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
10 Id. at 1748 (“In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.”). 
11 Id. at 1750 (“Although the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer 
contract to demand it ex post.”). 
12 Id. (“The rule is limited to adhesion contracts … but the times in which consumer contracts were anything 
other than adhesive are long past …. The [requirement of predictably small damages], however, is toothless and 
malleable … and the [requirement of an alleged scheme to cheat consumers] has no limiting effect, as all that is 
required is an allegation.”). 
13 Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 
1750). 
14 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
15 Id. at 1748. 
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on arbitration provisions.16  The Discover Bank rule, therefore, “[stood] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” under the FAA.17  
Stated more broadly, the Supreme Court envisioned the FAA preempting state laws that rely on 
public policy grounds to allow a consumer to demand class-wide arbitration ex post, despite 
contractually agreeing to submit all disputes to bilateral arbitration.18 
In its holding, the Court roundly rejected the dissent’s argument that class-wide 
arbitration was “necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the 
legal system.”19  Instead, the Court saw that the FAA’s overriding purpose was to protect bilateral 
arbitration agreements, prioritizing freedom of contract over any “unrelated” public policy 
interests inherent to small-dollar claims.20  This language struck directly at the heart of the 
consumer protection rationale behind Discover Bank.21 
III.  DISCUSSION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s scathing critique of class-wide arbitration in AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, the concept of class-wide arbitration and its availability remains alive and well.  
However, state laws requiring the availability of class-wide arbitration—despite consumers 
having already waived the procedure pursuant to contract—would almost certainly be preempted 
by the FAA.  The status of state laws resembling Discover Bank is presently in flux.  Some courts 
have held that the FAA preempts such state laws, while other state laws remain undecided. 
A. States Where Courts Have Already Applied AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
Several federal courts have addressed the holding in AT&T Mobility when applying the 
law of states in which class-wide arbitration waivers have been held as unenforceable.  The U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have reviewed the state 
unconscionability rules of New Jersey, Minnesota, and Florida in light of the Court’s decision in 
AT&T Mobility.22  Additionally, federal district courts have reviewed the unconscionability rules 
                                                     
16 Id. at 1747. 
17 Id. at 1753. 
18 Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1212. 
19 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (citing 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
20 Id. at 1753; see also Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1212. 
21 The California Court of Appeals has recently sought to circumvent the AT&T Mobility holding by using the 
same public policy rationale of protecting consumers with small-dollar claims to find arbitration clauses containing 
class waivers, but relying on other pro-defendant provisions. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion superseded by 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012). 
22 Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting New Jersey’s law that held waiver of class 
arbitrations are unconscionable); Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding AT&T 
Mobility would bar plaintiffs from bringing an unconscionability argument under Minnesota common law to challenge 
a class waiver); Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1208 (discussing AT&T Mobility and its effect on Florida’s unconscionability 
doctrine). 
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of Pennsylvania, Washington, and Oregon.23  As these are some of the first cases to review class-
wide arbitration waivers in the wake of AT&T Mobility, they are useful to predict how courts may 
interpret the Supreme Court’s holding when analyzing similar rules in other states.  Taken 
together, these initial cases demonstrate a tendency by federal courts to broadly apply AT&T 
Mobility’s holding to preempt state laws that ban class-action waivers on public policy grounds. 
1. New Jersey  
In Muhammed v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., the New Jersey Supreme Court 
articulated its unconscionability rule when faced with a class-wide arbitration waiver in a 
consumer contract.24  Muhammed involved a payday loan agreement that specifically prohibited 
class arbitration and class litigation in the event of a dispute.25  The court held that adhesive 
contracts are unconscionable where (1) they waive a party’s right to a class action in both the 
arbitration and litigation forums and (2) the “disputes between the contracting parties predictably 
involve small amounts of damages.”26  The court was particularly sympathetic to the argument 
that absent class-wide proceedings, “rational consumers may decline to pursue individual 
consumer-fraud lawsuits because it may not be worth the time spent prosecuting the suit, even if 
competent counsel was willing to take the case.”27  Echoing the rationale behind Discover Bank, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court found ruling otherwise would serve as a functional exculpation of 
the drafting party’s wrongful conduct.28 
In Litman v. Cellco Partnership, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit reviewed 
New Jersey’s Muhammed rule for the first time in light of AT&T Mobility.29  Prior to AT&T 
Mobility, the Third Circuit upheld the Muhammed rule in Homa v. American Express Co. by 
stressing that Muhammed applied to class-action waivers that prevent a party from seeking class 
proceedings in both arbitration and litigation.30  The court originally found that this distinction 
triggered the savings provision of FAA § 2 because the rule did not expressly target arbitration 
agreements, but was instead a “generally applicable contract defense.”31   The Homa distinction 
was no longer applicable given that the class waiver upheld in AT&T Mobility applied to both 
class arbitration and litigation.32  The Third Circuit abrogated its prior decisions, construing 
                                                     
23 King v. Advance Am., Nos. 07-237, 07-3142, 2011 WL 3861898, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011) (finding 
Pennsylvania unconscionability rule banning class waivers preempted by the FAA); Adams v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 
816 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (discussing AT&T Mobility’s effect on Washington’s Scott rule); 
Willis v. Debt Care, USA, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-430-ST, 2011 WL 7121456, at *6–8 (D. Or. Oct. 24, 2011) (analogizing 
Oregon’s unconscionability rule banning class waivers to Discover Bank rule). 
24 Muhammed v. Cty Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99 (N.J. 2006). 
25 Id. at 91–93. 
26 Id. at 99. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 100. 
29 Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2011). 
30 Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2009). 
31 Id. 
32 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
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AT&T Mobility broadly and holding, in Litman, that the FAA preempts the Muhammed rule, 
despite the distinction previously relied upon in Homa.33 
2. Florida 
Unlike New Jersey, Florida courts did not create a succinct state-wide doctrine on the 
unconscionability of class-action waivers in arbitration agreements.34  In McKenzie v. Betts—
Florida’s most recent pre-AT&T Mobility case—the plaintiff attacked the validity of a class-action 
waiver found within a cash advance agreement.35  The McKenzie court struck down the class-
action waiver on public policy grounds because it precluded consumers from effectively pursuing 
a civil action against another party to an adhesive contract.36  Specifically, the plaintiff provided 
sufficient expert testimony to persuade the court that competent attorneys would not represent 
plaintiffs in individual arbitration proceedings for small-dollar disputes, thus denying consumers 
a viable option to exercise their protected consumer rights.37 
The Eleventh Circuit examined Florida’s unconscionability law post-AT&T Mobility in 
Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, which involved a class waiver agreement almost identical to the 
contract at issue in AT&T Mobility.38   
The court read AT&T Mobility broadly to mean the FAA would 
preempt any “state rules mandating the availability of class arbitration 
based on generalizable characteristics of consumer protection 
claims.”39   
Though the court believed AT&T Mobility had broad applicability, the court concluded 
that the holding would require a case-by-case analysis under the particular circumstances of the 
class-wide arbitration waiver.40  The court did not target any specific Florida law on class-wide 
waivers, but stated in dicta that the FAA would preempt any Florida law that invalidates class 
waiver provisions “simply because the claims are of small value, the potential claims are 
numerous, and many consumers might not know about or pursue the potential claims absent class 
                                                     
33 Litman, 655 F.3d at 231 (“We understand the holding of Concepcion to be both broad and clear”). (emphasis 
added); see also Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-cv-3338 (NLH)(KMW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
66649, at *19-20 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011) (finding AT&T Mobility invalidates New Jersey’s Muhammad rule). 
34 Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1213 n.12 (11th Cir. 2011); Compare Fonte v. AT&T 
Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 1019, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding class waiver because the consumer 
had all the same substantive rights against AT&T despite the waiver, including attorney’s fees, injunctive relief and 
damages), with McKenzie v. Betts, 55 So. 3d 615, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (striking down class waiver provision 
based on credible evidence that competent counsel would not represent individual plaintiffs in small claims), and 
Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (striking down class waiver provision because 
it precluded availability of punitive damages, injunctive relief and the ability to pursue class action on claims that are 
“too small to litigate individually”). 
35 McKenzie, 55 So. 3d at 618–19. 
36 Id. at 624. 
37 Id. at 623. 
38 Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1210–11. 
39 Id. at 1212. 
40 Id. at 1205, 1214–15; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, No. DKC 11-2245, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124839, 
at *20 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2011). 
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procedures.”41   The court’s language strongly echoes Justice Scalia’s AT&T Mobility attack on 
the “unrelated” public policy rationale behind protecting consumers with small-dollar claims.42 
3. Minnesota 
Minnesota did not have a specific rule addressing the unconscionability of class waivers 
in contracts of adhesion.  The Eighth Circuit, however, still applied AT&T Mobility to reject the 
plaintiff’s attempt to apply the unconscionability analysis to a class-wide arbitration waiver.43  In 
Green v. SuperShuttle International, Inc., the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to 
compel individual arbitration, despite the plaintiff’s argument that the class-wide waiver 
provision was an “unfair and inequitable practice” in violation of Minnesota consumer protection 
laws.44  Although Minnesota courts had not articulated an unconscionability rule specifically on 
class waivers, the court determined that AT&T Mobility’s holding would bar any attempts to use 
Minnesota public policy grounds to strike down class-wide arbitration waivers.45 
4. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania laid out its rule on the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in 
Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp.46  In Thibodeau, the Pennsylvania Superior Court articulated a rule 
striking down class-wide litigation and arbitration waivers in contracts of adhesion as expressly 
unconscionable and unenforceable.47  To support its broad holding, the court stressed the public 
policy behind granting consumers the right to proceed as a class on small-dollar claims.48  Like 
the McKenzie court in Florida, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was particularly concerned about 
the lack of qualified representation available to consumers seeking small-dollar recoveries.49  The 
court reasoned that adhesive contracts forcing consumers to litigate or arbitrate individually 
would effectively immunize defendant corporations from most consumer grievances.50 
After AT&T Mobility, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
looked to AT&T Mobility, along with the Third Circuit’s discussion in Litman, to hold that the 
FAA preempted Thibodeau.51  In King v. Advance America, the court declined to apply 
Thibodeau and granted defendant’s motion to compel individual arbitration.52  The court 
discerned no significant difference between Pennsylvania’s Thibodeau rule, California’s Discover 
                                                     
41 Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1213. 
42 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
43 Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011). 
44 Id.; see Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 177.21–.35 (2011). 
45 Green, 653 F.3d at 769. 
46 Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); see generally Dickler v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 864–67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (endorsing class arbitration as a “fair an efficient 
method of adjudicating” small-dollar consumer claims). 
47 Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 886. 
48 Id. at 884 (“Class action lawsuits are and remain the essential vehicle by which consumers may vindicate their 
lawful rights.”). 
49 Id. at 885. 
50 Id. 
51 King v. Advance Am., Nos. 07-237, 07-3142, 2011 WL 3861898, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). 
52 Id. 
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Bank rule, or New Jersey’s Muhammed rule.53  The court also noted that the Third Circuit, in 
Litman, suggested Pennsylvania’s Thibodeau rule was even more likely to contravene the FAA 
than the preempted Muhammed rule.54  Relying heavily on Litman, the court broadly construed 
AT&T Mobility to find the FAA preempted state unconscionability laws that relied on general 
concepts of public policy.55 
5. Washington 
Washington originally announced its rule on the unconscionability of class waivers in 
2007 when the Washington Supreme Court refused to enforce such a waiver in a cellular service 
provider agreement.56  In Scott v. Cingular Wireless, the court found that class-wide arbitration 
waivers effectively deny customers a forum in which to vindicate their protected consumer 
rights.57  The court articulated a rule that declared class-wide waivers as unconscionable where: 
(1) many customers of the same company have the same or similar complaint; and (2) each 
consumer is damaged a small amount.58  In articulating the rationale for the rule, the Court relied 
heavily upon the reasons used by the California Supreme Court in crafting the Discover Bank 
rule.59 
Due to the close relationship between the Scott and Discover Bank rules, U.S. district 
courts that have evaluated Washington’s unconscionability rule, post-AT&T Mobility, have found 
little distinction between the two.60  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California, in In re Apple, found that the FAA preempted the Scott rule particularly because that 
rule was “based on Discover Bank.”61  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington similarly agreed that AT&T Mobility dismissed the public policy concerns over 
small-dollar legal proceedings that motivated both the Discover Bank and Scott decisions.62 
6. Oregon 
The Oregon Court of Appeals briefly articulated the unconscionability of class waivers in 
arbitration clauses in Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon Inc., where an arbitration rider on a 
home loan agreement waived the borrower’s right to proceed as a class in any disputes against the 
creditors. 63  In finding the waiver unconscionable and unenforceable, the court discussed the 
waiver’s impact on consumers bringing small-dollar claims.64  The court stated that “the class 
                                                     
53 Id. 
54 Id. (citing Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 229 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
55 Id. 
56 Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1009 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1006–07 (noting class arbitration is “often the only meaningful type of redress available for small but 
widespread injuries” and denying that procedure exculpates defendant’s fraudulent conduct). 
60 Adams v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2011); In re Apple, No. C-10-
02553 RMW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78276, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2011). 
61 In re Apple, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78276, at *13 (applying Washington law). 
62 Adams, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. 
63 Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or. Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 949–51 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). 
64 Id. at 951. 
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action ban is unilateral in effect and, more significantly, it gives the defendant a virtual license to 
commit, with impunity, millions of dollars’ worth of small-scale fraud.”65  While not wholly 
adopting the Discover Bank rule, the Court noted that it agreed with the California Supreme Court 
in Discover Bank that “class-wide arbitrations are workable and appropriate in some cases.”66 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed the Vasquez-Lopez holding in 
light of AT&T Mobility to find that the FAA preempted the decision in Willis v. Debt Care, USA, 
Inc.67  In Willis, the court stated that Vasquez-Lopez rule was the “functional equivalent of the 
Discover Card [sic] rule by mandating the availability of class arbitration for consumer protection 
claims.”68  This close relation meant that, despite the class action procedure being the only way 
the Willis’s could effectively recover damages in the case, the FAA preempted the Vasquez-
Lopez rule.69 
B. States That Rule Class-wide Arbitration Waivers Unconscionable But Have Yet 
to Consider AT&T Mobility. 
The majority of states that declare class-wide arbitration waivers unconscionable have yet 
to address the issue through case law.  To a large extent, the rules articulated by these states rely 
on some modicum of public policy rationale to justify striking down class-wide arbitration 
waivers.  Common elements include the lack of competent representation for individuals 
attempting to dispute small-dollar claims, the adhesive nature of the contract, and the desire to 
hold corporations accountable for potentially fraudulent action.  If AT&T Mobility is read and 
applied broadly, as it has been thus far by federal courts, state laws relying on these elements 
would receive the same harsh scrutiny as the Discover Bank rule and would likely not be spared 
by the FAA § 2 savings provision.  Further, the FAA would likely also preempt rules in states 
such as New Jersey that attempted to walk the fine line by applying unconscionability rules 
equally to both arbitration and litigation class waivers. 
1. States in the First Circuit 
In Massachusetts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Kristian v. Comcast 
Corp., applied Massachusetts state unconscionability principles to a class waiver.70  The plaintiffs 
in Kristian sued Comcast under state and federal antitrust laws.  The plaintiffs attacked the 
validity of the class action waiver when their suit was moved to mandatory arbitration as required 
under the cable television service agreement.71   
The court’s discussion focused primarily on the unconscionability of the class action 
waiver as it related to the rights granted by federal antitrust statutes. The court, however, noted an 
unconscionability analysis under Massachusetts state law would be analogous to its application of 
                                                     
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 950 (quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1116.). 
67 Willis v. Debt Care, USA, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-430-ST, 2011 WL 7121456, at *6-8 (D. Or. Oct. 24, 2011). 
68 Id. at *6. 
69 Id. at *8. 
70 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
71 Id. at 37. 
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federal antitrust laws.72  Indeed, part of the rationale for striking down the class waiver was that it 
prevented the plaintiffs from vindicating their state and federally-granted statutory rights.73  In 
finding the class waiver unconscionable, the court emphasized the difficulty an individual 
plaintiff would face when seeking to arbitrate a dispute involving small-dollar claims.74  The 
relatively low damages available to an individual plaintiff, when compared with the weighty 
financial burden required to pursue a claim, would be “so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of 
claims” at all.75  The court further found that the unconscionability of the class waiver, 
particularly in an antitrust context, made the general mandatory arbitration provision 
unenforceable.76 
Although the Kristian case centers primarily on the statutory antitrust rights of 
consumers, the rule articulated by the First Circuit arguably still applies to Massachusetts’s 
unconscionability law.  The court relied heavily on the public policy grounds of balancing the 
cost of arbitration with the potential recovery in small-dollar claims in its decision to find the 
waiver unconscionable under Massachusetts law.  This rationale is analogous to that articulated 
by the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank, which the U.S. Supreme Court roundly 
rejected in AT&T Mobility.  As such, the Kristian holding, to the extent it is based on 
Massachusetts law, would likely be preempted by the FAA despite its additional reliance on 
federal antitrust law.77   
2. States in the Fourth Circuit 
The North Carolina Supreme Court held class-wide waivers in arbitration clauses 
unconscionable in the plurality decision in Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.78  In 
Tillman, the Court noted that the class waiver provision in an adhesive mortgage contract could 
be a factor evaluated by a court within the greater unconscionability analysis.79  The Court based 
its rationale for the holding on the unavailability of effective counsel in small-dollar individual 
arbitrations, as well as the lopsided benefit a class waiver gives to lenders.80 
The Tillman rule could potentially be distinguished from similar rules in other states.  In 
particular, the court noted that the class waiver, taken alone, may not be sufficient to render the 
arbitration clause in an adhesive contract unconscionable.81  In holding the arbitration clause 
                                                     
72 Id. at 63–64 (“As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the vindication of statutory rights 
analysis and the unconscionability analysis.”); see also Skirchak v. Dynamics Reas. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 
(D. Mass. 2006) (finding class arbitration waiver unconscionable under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–219 (2011)). 
73 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 29. 
74 Id. at 59. 
75 Id. at 55. 
76 Id. at 59. 
77 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently sought to confine AT&T Mobility to rules that 
do not rely on federal statutory rights to require the availability of class arbitration.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 
667 F.3d 204, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing AT&T Mobility as pertaining only to judicially-crafted 
unconscionability rules disfavoring class action waivers and not applicable to cases relying on federal, statute-based, 
antitrust rights). 
78 Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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unconscionable, the Court also based its decision on the presence of a “loser-pays all” provision 
and the right for a loser to seek expensive, de novo appeal from the initial arbitration decision.82  
A court evaluating whether the FAA preempts Tillman may note this distinction from Discover 
Bank.  Given AT&T Mobility’s hostility towards the public policy rationale articulated in Tillman, 
however, this distinction may not be sufficient to save Tillman from FAA preemption.83  
West Virginia was an early proponent of striking class-wide arbitration waivers, as 
established in State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger.84  In Berger, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
addressed a class-wide arbitration waiver in a purchasing and finance agreement between jewelry 
distributers and their customers.85  Along with a prohibition on punitive damages, the Court 
declared the class waiver in the contract of adhesion to be unconscionable.86  The Court 
emphasized the small recovery amount involved in the dispute and its effect on a customer’s 
ability to find effective counsel to prosecute their claim.87  Without the ability to pursue class 
actions, the Court reasoned that aggrieved customers would be unable to vindicate their protected 
consumer rights.88  The rule articulated by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Berger, along 
with the public policy emphasis behind it, would seem to be analogous to the Discover Bank rule, 
and thus squarely within the preemptive reach of the FAA.89 
3. States in the Sixth Circuit 
Michigan originally recognized an inherent unconscionability in class waivers in Lozada 
v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc.90  Although the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan primarily evaluated the class waiver at issue under federal statutory requirements—the 
court also found that class waivers were unconscionable under Michigan consumer protection 
laws.91  The court focused on Congress’s intent to protect borrowers in the federal Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA), holding that the statute required the availability of class arbitration.92  The 
court also stated that the class action waiver in the arbitration clause would also violate the 
Michigan Consumer Protection Act, which expressly permits class actions for aggrieved 
consumers.93  Since the court’s analysis under Michigan law is devoid of any public policy 
rationale and is based on express statutory authorization, the holding may not be subject to FAA 
preemption in the same manner as Discover Bank.  The absence of any specific unconscionability 
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test under Michigan public policy would lead to difficulty for a court reviewing AT&T Mobility’s 
effect on Lozada. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court held the class action waiver in an arbitration clause 
unconscionable in 2010 in Schnuerle v. Insight Communications Co.94  The Schnuerle case 
involved an internet service agreement with an arbitration clause that waived class actions in both 
litigation and arbitration.95  The court found the service agreement was a contract of adhesion and 
articulated the economic need to allow customers to proceed in class actions over small-dollar 
disputes (whether that be arbitration or litigation).96  The court was also persuaded by other states 
that barred class action waivers, including California in Discover Bank, and held that “the 
absolute ban upon class action litigation is unenforceable in this case, and in like cases, as 
exculpatory, substantively unconscionable, and contrary to public policy.”97   
The Kentucky Supreme Court stripped the class action waiver provision from the 
contract, but the court upheld the rest of the arbitration provision.98  Strong state interests 
favoring arbitration compelled the court to remand the case for binding arbitration, which could 
proceed on a class-wide basis.99  Although the court’s action distinguishes this case from 
Discover Bank, it likely will not save the court’s rule from preemption by the FAA.  The court’s 
holding allowed the general arbitration provision to survive, but it had the effect of compelling 
class-wide arbitration on the parties.  This action, and the public policy grounds upon which it 
was based, still conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court’s criticism of laws which require class-
wide arbitration as an ex post option for small-dollar plaintiffs. 
The Ohio Court of Appeals addressed class arbitration waivers under the state’s 
consumer protection laws in Schwartz v. Alltel Corp.100  In Schwartz, the plaintiff-consumer 
signed a cellular service contract containing a class arbitration waiver and a waiver of attorney 
fees.101  The court found the cellular agreement was a contract of adhesion, and that the 
combination of the class waiver and the attorney fee waiver was substantively unconscionable.102  
In particular, the court believed that the class waiver “directly hinder[ed] the consumer protection 
purposes of the” Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act.103  The court reasoned that requiring 
individual arbitration was not cost-effective and would be of little use in ending abusive corporate 
practices like the one at issue in the litigation.104   
The Schwartz opinion is short on the court’s rationale for finding the unconscionability of 
the class waiver. The Court’s discussion of the inefficient cost of pursuing individual arbitration, 
however, indicates a concern for the ability of consumers to bring suits for small-dollar claims.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in AT&T Mobility, a consumer contract of adhesion 
involving small-dollar claims would almost always trigger the Discover Bank rule requiring class-
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wide arbitration.105  Similarly, the Schwartz holding would have the same effect of providing de 
facto class arbitration in almost all consumer disputes.  Although the holding did not state that the 
class waiver, on its own, would be unconscionable–similar to North Carolina’s Tillman holding–
when viewed after AT&T Mobility, the FAA would likely preempt Schwartz. 
4. States in the Seventh Circuit 
The Illinois Supreme Court established its rule for the unconscionability of class waivers 
in Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC when it reviewed the arbitration clause of a cellular service 
agreement.106  The court determined that the overall arbitration provision was unconscionable and 
unenforceable because: (1) it was a contract of adhesion; (2) it waived a consumer’s right to class 
actions; (3) it did not reveal the cost of arbitration; and (4) it contained a liquidated damages 
clause (the penalty at issue over early termination fees).107 The court relied heavily on the 
plaintiff’s argument that the cost of arbitrating her small-dollar claim against Cingular 
individually would generally be greater than any recovery she could receive if she won in 
arbitration.108  Additionally, the court believed that the service agreement’s failure to disclose the 
costs for a consumer to pursue the arbitration would further preclude customers from vindicating 
their rights.109  Like the Kentucky Supreme Court in Schnuerle, the Illinois Supreme Court 
stripped the offending class waiver provision from the contract and enforced the remainder of the 
arbitration agreement.110 
Like Tillman and Schwartz, the Kinkel case singled out class waiver as one of several 
elements that made the arbitration clause unconscionable.  Although the Illinois Supreme Court 
may not have considered the class waiver, in and of itself, unconscionable, the court’s emphasis 
on the need for class-wide arbitration in small-dollar claims is inherently a public policy 
argument.  AT&T Mobility expressly stated that the FAA would preempt state unconscionability 
rules that were based on matters of “unrelated” public policy that favored plaintiffs in small-
dollar claims.111 
5. States in the Eighth Circuit 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Whitney v. Alltell Communications, Inc., evaluated a 
class waiver in a cellular phone service agreement and determined that the arbitration clause’s 
class waiver was unconscionable because it restricted a consumer’s rights under the Missouri 
Merchandising Practices Act. 112   In its holding, the court considered the class waiver as one 
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factor, in addition to provisions that limited the defendant’s liability and required plaintiff to bear 
the costs of arbitration up-front, in holding the arbitration clause unconscionable.113  When 
analyzing the combined effect of these restrictive contractual provisions, the Court was 
particularly concerned with the prohibitive effect they would have on small-dollar claims.114  The 
Court stated that “the costs would be so prohibitively expensive as to preclude, for all practical 
purposes, an aggrieved party from seeking redress for a violation of the Merchandising Practices 
Act.”115 
The Missouri Court of Appeals later evaluated the unconscionability of class waivers in 
adhesive contracts head-on in Woods v. QC Financial Services, Inc.116  The Woods case dealt 
with a payday loan agreement containing a class arbitration waiver.117  The Court of Appeals 
looked to both New Jersey’s Muhammad rule and California’s Discover Bank rule to expressly 
hold that class waivers in contracts of adhesion are unconscionable.118  In doing so, the Court’s 
holding adopted the three-pronged Discover Bank rule as applicable to Missouri contract law.119 
The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Whitney and Woods holdings in Brewer v. 
Missouri Title Loans, Inc. in 2010, striking the class waiver in the arbitration clause as 
unconscionable and ordering class arbitration to proceed.120 The defendant in Brewer requested 
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which promptly remanded the case back to the Missouri 
Supreme Court to be decided in light of AT&T Mobility.121  Based on Missouri’s wholesale 
adoption of the Discover Bank rule in Woods, the Missouri Supreme Court will almost certainly 
have to reverse its holding in Brewer and order arbitration with the class waiver intact.122 
6. States in the Ninth Circuit 
In Cooper v. QC Financial Services, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona applied Arizona law to hold a class waiver in a payday loan agreement 
unconscionable.123  The customer alleged QC Financial assessed “fees” on her payday loan, 
which eventually accrued to almost three times the principal of her loan.124  In a lengthy 
discussion of the need for class actions in both litigation and arbitration, the court emphasized the 
necessity of class arbitration for disputes involving small recoveries.125  In particular, the court 
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believed the class waiver in the arbitration clause made it almost impossible for a customer to 
find an attorney for small-dollar claims, thus effectively “immun[izing] a defendant from scrutiny 
and accountability for its business practices.”126  The court looked to the Discover Bank rule in 
neighboring California and found the situation analogous to the case sub judice.  Persuaded by 
Discover Bank’s rationale, the court wholly adopted the Discover Bank rule and held the class 
waiver unconscionable and unenforceable.127  Arizona’s wholesale adoption of Discover Bank 
means that the FAA would almost certainly preempt Cooper’s holding in Arizona. 
The Nevada Supreme Court adopted a rule barring class waivers in arbitration clauses 
just before AT&T Mobility in Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, ex rel. Cty. of 
Clark.128  In Picardi, the court found that the class waiver in a car sales contract was 
unconscionable as against state public policy favoring the availability of class actions.129  The 
court looked to other jurisdictions that bar class waivers, including California, and found that the 
strong public policy of Nevada supported allowing class procedures for individual consumers 
with valid but small claims.130  Since the Picardi court was relies heavily on rules in other states 
that have already been preempted by the FAA in the wake of AT&T Mobility, it is likely that the 
Picardi rule would suffer the same fate if challenged. 
7. States in the Tenth Circuit 
The New Mexico Supreme Court established a decidedly pro-consumer rule when it 
evaluated the unconscionability of class waivers in Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., where the 
plaintiff agreed to the Dell website’s “terms and conditions” when he purchased a computer 
online. 131   The “terms and conditions” included a binding class arbitration waiver, which the 
plaintiff challenged in his claim that Dell engaged in false advertising.132  The New Mexico 
Supreme Court delivered a lengthy discussion of the state’s strong public policy favoring the 
availability of class actions for injured consumers, particularly in small-dollar claims.133  The 
court stated that “the class action functions as a gatekeeper to relief when the cost of bringing a 
single claim is greater than the damages alleged” in small-dollar disputes.134  The court then 
invalidated the class waiver as substantively unconscionable and against New Mexico public 
policy.135  Unlike similar rules articulated by other states, the court believed that class waivers 
were so “overwhelmingly” unconscionable that the court did not even need to determine whether 
the “terms and conditions” at issue was considered an adhesive contract.136 
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s rule in Fiser was tantamount to a blanket requirement 
for class-wide arbitration in any consumer contract that could involve small-dollar claims.  This 
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rule goes much further than Discover Bank, which provides three prongs that must be met, one of 
which is that the contract be adhesive.137  Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s aversion to the 
relatively more narrowly-tailored Discover Bank rule, the broader Fiser rule would almost 
certainly fall prey to FAA preemption under AT&T Mobility. 
8. States in the Eleventh Circuit 
The Alabama Supreme Court tackled the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers 
early in 2002 in Leonard v. Terminix International Co., L.P.138  In Leonard, the plaintiffs brought 
suit against Terminix for charging them yearly renewal fees while failing to conduct the yearly 
inspections in violation of both the agreement and Alabama consumer statues.139  In examining 
the class waiver in the arbitration clause, the court emphasized the disproportionately small 
recovery available to a plaintiff prosecuting small-dollar claims when compared to the costs of 
arbitration.140  The court also highlighted how this disproportionate balance led to a dearth of 
attorneys who would be willing to represent a plaintiff in an individual arbitration.141  The court 
found the class waiver was unconscionable because the Terminix agreement was a contract of 
adhesion, which restricted the plaintiff to a forum where the expense of pursuing a claim far 
exceeded the amount in controversy.142  Due to the public policy rationale behind the rule, and the 
likelihood that it is even more broadly applicable to class waivers than the Discover Bank rule, 
the FAA would likely preempt this rule under AT&T Mobility. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
From the case law to date, federal courts have been very active in using the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility to strike down state rules against class-wide arbitration bans.  
The Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions of Litman and Cruz, in particular, articulate the breadth 
of the AT&T Mobility decision.  Since almost all the states that have found class arbitration 
waivers unconscionable have relied on the same state public policy rationale of Discover Bank, it 
seems that the majority of these state laws would be subject to FAA preemption. 
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